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ABSTRACT

A dilemma faces the ethnographer whose discipline forces the creation of an objective text from an intimate participatory experience. There have been three ways in which ethnographers have attempted to solve the dilemma of producing the objectivity of a scientific text while acknowledging their presence in the field. The first approach is the disembodied ethnography which is based on denial. The second way is via the self-indulgent ethnography. In this approach, the author is at center stage making the impact of his presence the main ingredient of the document. The third approach is the disjointed ethnography in which the ethnographer acts as a middle man separating the subject's voice and the author's voice. The inadequacy of these approaches comes from two problems. First, the dual role of friendships and informants causes emotional strain which results in the ethnographer becoming a trickster promising not to lie, but never telling the whole truth. Second, ethnographers--in the way they choose topics, in the manner they collect, record, and categorize data, and in the final form of the document--make choices which are a product of selective memory. The clinical ethnography (CE), a type of ethnography that combines the self-reflective honesty associated with clinical psychology, the stringency of scientific observation, and the writing skills of narrative essayists, can be a means of solving the enthnographic dilemma. Clinical ethnography accepts, as a legitimate outcome of its work, provocations instead of conclusions. (Fifteen endnotes and 25 references are attached.) (MG)

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The Ethnographic Dilemma

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ABSTRACT:

The Ethnographic Dilemma
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A dilemma faces the ethnographer whose discipline requires the creation of an objective text from an intimate participatory experience. The article discusses three types of ethnographies which avoid solving the dilemma: the disembodied, the self indulgent, and the disjointed ethnography. The inadequacy of these approaches comes from two problems. First, the dual role of friendships and informants causes emotional strain which results in the ethnographer becoming a trickster promising not to lie, but never telling the whole truth. Second, ethnographers in the way they choose topics, in the manner of how they collect, record and categorize data, and in the final form of the document make choices which are a product of selective memory. The clinical ethnography, comprised of the self-reflection of clinical psychology and the writing techniques of narrative essays, is introduced as a means to solve the dilemma.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC DILEMMA

The Dilemma:

A dilemma faces the ethnographer whose discipline forces the creation of a scientific text from an intimate experience which naturally calls for more of a personal testimony. The scientific discipline requires ethnographers to participate, but with distance: to belong, but to remain objective. If they write about how they were altered by the field experience than the text is described by scientific colleagues as subjective and sentimental, as a self-indulgent embellishment which is not part of the scientific credo. On the other hand the cool presentation of the detached narrator not only brings criticism of insensitivity, but it lacks the convincing depth of personal experience. In foregoing this essential experience the writer becomes disembodied.

There have been three ways in which ethnographers have attempted to solve the dilemma of producing the objectivity of a scientific text while acknowledging their presence in the field. The first approach is the disembodied ethnography. This approach is based on denial. The author is absent, or appears only in the introduction, and the subjects' voices are represented from a filtered but supposedly unbiased view[1].

The second way ethnographers have attempted to solve the dilemma is via the self indulgent ethnography. In this approach the author is at center stage making the impact of his (her) presence the main ingredient of the document[2].

The third approach is the disjointed ethnography. In this case the ethnographer acts as a middle man separating the subject's voice, which is often presented verbatim to the reader, and the author's own voice[3].

Each of the three approaches has its limitations, and none of them solves the ethnographer's dilemma which rests on two psychological phenomena: betrayal and selective memory.

The first approach, the most traditional, almost invariably begins with a personal account briefly stated in the introduction, followed by a text in which the "truth" is presented in its "pristine" form. This is exemplified in Berland's (1984) travels with the Qalander, a group of nomadic entertainers in Pakistan[4]. Berland begins by stating that he was with the Qalander to investigate "the nature of individual and group differences in behavior (pg. 4)" which is reduced in the text to an account of the Qalander's cognitive style derived from giving standardized psychological tests. This type of significant announcement at the outset is often mirrored in the title. This is followed by a set of data that could not conceivably be as grandiose as the title suggests. This is common in the traditional ethnography[5].

From Berland's introduction we learn that the Qalander annually roam a 2,000 mile circle where they perform magic tricks, train animals for shows, and

where children as young as five are taught to tell lewd sexual jokes for money. In spite of perking our interest about the Qalander we get very little information about how his sedentary, urban, and highly industrialized eyes filtered what he saw, or how he was changed by the experience.

The reader wants to learn more about how it was that he endured the hardship and pleasure of such a journey with the Qalander. Since there is no information about how it was that he traveled or slept in their tents, or what the daily adventure of the long trail meant to him the reader was left wondering about the biases in the test. However, the introduction reduced the uncertainty by its language which was personal, by the material which was intriguing and inviting, and by letting the reader in on the heroic adventure the author had taken. It was written like an aside conversation in which the story teller, coming off stage and breaking character, speaks the truth, revealing what really is on his mind. This of course prepares the audience to accept the character on stage[6].

Such personal introductions, by making it clear that "I've been there", prepare the reader to accept the text without questioning the author's scientific legitimacy about how it was they got the "real material" of the culture under study. The more we believe in the author's authority the easier it is to eliminate further discussion of how the author might have effected the collection and interpretation of data.

Personal introductions also serve another function. They reveal the difficulty inherent in writing a scientific text from personal field work experience. Because

ethnographers write very personally in their introductions, consistently coming off stage when in fact the script does not call for it, introductions display the author's ambiguities about how to present themselves in their work. Having to deny their own voices in the text, they reveal themselves in the introductions in order to have their voices heard.

Berland's (1984) decision to avoid placing himself in the text is in contrast with Casteneda's (1968; 1971) nearly narcissistic involvement with it. Because Casteneda gave us very little information about Don Juan's shamanism and a good deal about his own mental conversion, we are left wondering if Geertz's (1988) conclusion about anthropological texts -- namely that they exist not so much to present information to readers, but that readers exist to receive them, to reconfirm their own myths or desires -- might not be more true than we like to believe.

By placing himself at center stage Casteneda took the stance, (common in the tradition of travel writing), of making himself too heroic. His texts, in not calling for personal restraint, challenge the reader to accept his person as the main focus, rather than accepting the information contained in the text as such. His wide success testified to the fact that he touched on some popular myths, but by not being more humble about is persona the scientific community doubted his authenticity. After all if he really found the spiritual nirvana he claimed, why spend the time and effort writing the ethnography?

Dwyer's (1982) style is that of a disjointed middle man. He tries to balance the text by presenting the words of the field subjects nearly verbatim in one part, and then in a completely separate part of the book he discusses his own problems conducting ethnography. These problems led him to renounce both the self-indulgent stance of Casteneda and the disembodied approach exemplified by Berland's work. But his text is divided, either he gives the voice to the subject (the Faquir) in a fairly standard format of questions and answers which are reported in a straight forward verbatim manner, or he totally dominates the narrative which his despairing self analysis of doing his, or any ethnographic work. The text fails to integrate his personal experience with the scientific form, leaving the reader to conclude that the authors real work is pointing out how impossible it is to do ethnography. We end up with less than sufficient information about the foreign culture, or about how he contributed to the story he tells.

For a variety of reasons none of the approaches reach the full height of ethnographic possibility. We end up with less than fully sufficient information about how the writers were changed by doing their work. Both of these aspects are important in ethnography because, taken together, they make up the essential ingredients possible for a wider understanding of human universals and cultural malleability.

I turn now to examine the reasons why the three types of ethnographies cited above have not adequately solved the dilemma of the ethnographer.

Ethnographer turned trickster:

The inadequacy of the three approaches come from two problems each of which is related to an act of betrayal. The first problem is that ethnographers are tricksters promising not to lie, but rarely telling the whole truth. The emotional strain produces by the ethnographer turned trickster begins from the problem that in doing their work ethnographers often become engaged as friends with their subjects. The dual role of friends and informants creates relationships which are both profound and functional. This is a formula that inevitably produces betrayal, and which, because it is felt as psychological tension, demands to be reduced, regardless of how it effects the accuracy of the written text.

The second reason for failure in trying to solve the ethnographic dilemma is that ethnographies are based on selective memory. Not only are ethnographies are based on selective memory. Not only are ethnographers typically unaware of how they have influenced their informants, or how they have been influenced by them, they also fail to give readers sufficient information about how they have contributed to forming and reporting the so called objective facts. This leads to an act of betrayal between ethnographer and reader.

Twenty years ago, to earn my PH.D. at the age of 25, I entered a high school as a senior and attended classes for a semester without my true identity being known. On my mind was getting enough notes to make up a dissertation and

earn the degree. I had to satisfy the needs of my career, but to do so was to present myself as someone who I was not. This involved making friends with people under the guise of being one of them, when in fact I had another identity. Part of what contributed to the painful reality of my persona was that I believed I might be able to help my friends understand their adolescence, and their high school experience.

At the same time I was collecting my data I was going back in time. I was revisiting my own adolescence. Reliving my experience of being a high school student (Aptekar 1981; 1982) brought back many dark ambivalences: about high school friends, about how I was treated by my teachers, about my emerging self. When the teachers in my "second" senior year did not contribute toward helping my new friends' self identity (from my perspective of course) I moved to intercede, but I could intervene only so far, since I had my second set of aims, namely to collect data.

Getting data from an unsuspecting culture gave me the uncomfortable feeling of being a trickster, of not lying to my subjects (and soon to be friends) but certainly of not telling them the whole truth. However, since I was granted permission to work undercover the advancement of science, (and my career), were legitimized. The result of the contradictory involvements, of being legitimate and illegitimate, was mirrored in the form of the final document where I avoided my personal responses in the text, and wrote as a detached and disembodied narrator to save myself moral or personal dilemma.

I have wondered, over the past twenty years, how much my adolescent experiences, and the burden of my feigned friendships, contributed to how the data was collected, and the writing of the final document. After collecting the data, I presented it as a lawyer preparing for trial to prove a point beyond a reasonable doubt[7]. I came to conclusions that might well have been no more than a personal reconstruction of events pieces together to ease my pain, and to prove the point I unconsciously went there to find and solve.

Since my representation of that school and my conclusion about high schools may be either scientific, objective perceptions, or autobiographical, subjective projections, and because I was never clear to the reader about how I tried to separate the two, I live with the trickster's burden. I was neither completely honest with the subjects of the study about who and why my purpose was, or completely honest with the readers about all the possible sources of bias in the data.

As members of the scientific community ethnographers are encouraged to exclude what might well be the heart of their lifeblood: the personal valve that connects them to their subjects. Thus, I was encouraged to sever the connection between my own adolescence and the adolescents I was studying. This made it very difficult to find my voice, so like the three ethnographic approaches outlined above, I was left with being a trickster, not only being unable to be completely honest with the subjects in the field, but also I could not be honest in the reporting of the data[8]

Keeping scientific, separating oneself from oneself:

Ethnographers are forced, "in the interest of science", to separate their personal histories from their work in the field. This makes it extremely difficult to solve the ethnographer's dilemma because it becomes impossible to be honest about how writers have influenced and have been influenced by the data. They cannot explore their own personal images that are invoked in doing the field work. In my ethnographic study of street children in Colombia (Aptekar 1988) I described many of the children as growing up in an orderly fashion from matrifocal homes which stressed an earlier independence from their parents than was common in the socially dominant patrifocal society in which they lived. However, according to the Colombian populace and to the international organizations which served the children, the children were considered "abandoned." While I demonstrated that the majority of street children had adequate mental health, the prevailing point of view was that they were emotionally ill. I described the children as being free of drugs and crime, while they were commonly portrayed as delinquent and worthy of incarceration[9].

My own personality not only drew me to the topic of street children, but also to the particular concepts that I abstracted from the data. My own personality determined how I presented the information in the written document. To say that I chose certain topics would be somewhat misleading because of the compelling,

and largely unconscious, nature of my motivations. For example, in the document I separated the children into gamines and chupagruesos. The first group comprised the children living in haughty display of their early independence from parent's who had tried to subjugate them. The second group was overwhelmed by their self pity and lived by attaching themselves to their older age mates. I was drawn to the gamines who brought smiles to my face, and I withdrew from the chupagruesos who touched with me sadness, even disdain. For other people (the international organizations and the press) the chupagruesos elicited pity while the gamines drew disdain.

My ambivalence about the children, which stemmed from my own ambivalence about independence and dependency from authority, led me to see this phenomena as a central aspect of the children's lives and in society's reaction to them. The personal reality that I brought to the study influenced the perceptions and interactions I had, which in turn contributed to the classifications of the children and the form of the document. In short, it may well be that my study was in large part a process of working through some very personal issues about children's independence from parents; a thought which became visible to me only as I was working on the final draft to be sent to publisher and later sustained in my most private conversations with myself.

Because it is difficult for ethnographer to know the private reasons for their choice of what they study another problem emerges. That problem is the difficulty in knowing how to address their audiences. This is particularly true as

the ethnographic dilemma compels the author to write for two audiences. In this essay I am writing for both myself and for my scientific colleagues. I write for myself to make sense out of the personal experience that is the ethnography. I write for my professional colleagues whose esteem I desire, and whose evaluations I need. What do I do when these two audiences are incompatible? I take one of the alternatives mentioned above, producing fragmented documents either in the form of the disembodied narrator of Berland (1984); in the self indulgence of Casteneda (1968; 1971), or in the disjointed "I and Other" of Dwyer (1982). All of these forms force the author into the role of a trickster. The writer either excludes how they have influenced the data, or they fail to sufficiently inform the audience about the culture[10].

There are two problems with this. One is that being a trickster does not reduce the burden of the ethnographer's dilemma and so the ethnographer is still at square one. The second is that in trying to separate one's personal from one's scholarly goals inevitably produces distortions of thought and writing. Both problems result in a betrayal which comes from the physchological burden that denying the personal element of a largely biographic experience creates. This in turn influences which "facts" are presented and how they are described. Getting past these problems is where I now turn my attention.

The Way Out: The Clinical Ethnography

The clinical ethnography (CE) is a type of ethnography that combines the self-reflective honesty associated with clinical psychology, the stringency of scientific observation, and the writing skills of narrative essayists. By including three elements in its work CE solves the ethnographic dilemma. First, in CE writers study their own psyches to learn how they effect the study from the beginning choice of the topic, to the final writing of the document. Second, in CE ethnographers understand that language is the foundation of their work, and therefore they accept that their traditions comes more from the humanities than from the natural sciences. Related to this is the third point. Clinical ethnography accepts as a legitimate outcome of its work, provocations instead of conclusions. Reductions of uncertainty in place of presentations of facts are considered acceptable outcomes.

Self as object of study:

Clinical ethnography is rooted in personal vulnerability. It demands the exploration of one's self. In my ethnography (Aptekar 1982a; 1986) of the face to face interactions between the handicapped and the non-disabled, I was interested in the meaning of the "mixed encounter." I was able to demonstrate that each side came to the dialogue with certain information that they wanted to avoid discussing, namely the handicapping condition. An illustration of this occurred when I had a chance encounter with a blind man begging in Latin America. From

the waist up he appeared to be healthy. He was wearing stylish dark glasses. His hair was professionally groomed and he exuded a general air of competence and intelligence. The lower part of his body told another story. His trousers has been purposely arranged not only to reveal his skinny and deformed legs, but also a plastic tube like those used in hospitals for transfusions. I felt embarrassed as my eyes followed his legs upward to his eyes where I saw my embarrassment reflected from his sunglasses. To make things worse, I had the conviction that in spite of his blindness he was seeing my discomfort--a discomfort based in part on what I felt to be my unwholesome need to stare at him. His prearranged costume gave him success as a beggar as well as alerting me to the dynamics of the interchange between the handicapped and the nondisabled. Not only was there information that the nonhandicapped felt compelled to discuss, namely a way to put the unease about the conversation they would prefer not to talk about to rest, but through submitting myself to this discomfort and exploring my reactions to it I was able to reveal the details of how each side managed the exchange.

As I admitted to the painful fact that I avoided or was over solicitous in my interactions with the disabled, I accepted the necessity of putting myself in the personal jeopardy of losing face, of being embarrassed, of making a social blunder--all of which were embedded in the very phenomena I wanted to describe.

In the process of this work I had a variety of emotional reactions to my subject matter. This led to the discovery of new information about my topic, which prompted me to engage myself further, which led to other emotional responses on my part and so forth. To work effectively I altered my original hypothesis and adopted a style of continual inquiry. By avoiding this series of personal explorations I would have lost the very information I was after, and by not writing about it I would have left the reader unappraised on how I effected the data and would have reduced the validity of the work. Instead, I chose to make clear what the traditional ethnographer has been told in the interest of science, to conceal: namely my "subjective" reactions[11]. As Devereux (1967) maintained the most reliable information for ethnographers is obtained from counter transference. Failing to take his own reactions into account led Malinowski (1955) to separate science from magic while the Asian Hsu studying the same material connected them (Hsu 1972)[12]

The fact is that most of the parameters of the relationship between ethnographer and informant exist before either side gets to the point of actually talking to the other. Clifford (Clifford & Marcus 1986) related an anecdote in which a fieldworker went to Gabon to see how religious traditions had changes over the time period following an active interchange with European traders. The fieldworker brought with him a text which described certain religious words and asked the informant, the current chief, about them. After several answers the chief seemed unable to respond to a question. He asked the ethnographer to

wait for a moment and returned with the same book the fieldworker had and read the answer to him.

If we accept that at some level ethnography is an interplay between a reality, (which is glossed over for a variety of reasons most of which are unknown to the actors), the interpretations of that reality by ethnographers (which are intertwined through past experiences), and the changed reality of the subject due to being part of a study (which can never be erased) then we must conclude that ethnographers carve a new reality. Much of this new reality comes from the personal histories of both the subjects and their observer[13].

Relying on language and accepting uncertainty:

Ethnographers reliance on language as an instrument aligns them with the humanist rather than the natural scientist. Ethnographers can ask their subjects about their lives while it is difficult for the geologist to speak directly to the mountain. The language is the vehicle by which we as ethnographers travel. It is a journey of pleasure and burden that we share with the humanists and the creative writers. But while language is a powerful tool it can also be powerfully misleading.

In the process of abstracting an experience the traditional ethnographic narrative has no plot, and no characters or scenes are developed. Anecdotes, often placed out of chronological order of their occurrence, are used to make reference to classes of abstractions such as "role," or "kinship." Then the

anecdotes are spliced together, creating and connecting abstract categories, which in turn are given hypothetical significance. These then are often used to make assumptions about human behavior across cultures. Because of this style, the human element of people's problems are drawn with a heavy brush, giving little information about the unique, the deviant, and the ambiguous. For these qualities people look toward the humanities and the narrative essayists[14].

Although the clinical ethnography can take many forms its ultimate purpose is different than traditional science with its commitment to reporting the truth in clearly replicable terms. The best the clinical ethnographer can hope for is to reduce the uncertainty of subjective truth. Although the CE document leaves the reader without the certainty of scientific truth it does evoke the imagery of the field experience. From this type of writing the reader comes to accept conclusions about human nature without having them clearly stated, but through the craft of the author's writing they are felt by the reader.

The dramatic control which is necessary to write a CE is not easy to come by. Many of the skills that are needed are taken from literary essayists. For example, in order to give readers a sense that they are in the field with the ethnographer the scene must be carefully drawn, the retelling of events might be placed in the present tense to encourage a sense of being there, a continuous use of evocative images, and rather than presenting generalized people, specific persons come into play, doing concrete things which are well defined. It also aims to provoke an emotional response and is thus less didactic than evocative.

These and other literary devices suggest that the CE is judged more by its literary quality than by its argumentative skills, which means that in the end the results are judged more in terms of the fidelity of the spirit than of its literal accuracy.

The biggest obstacle to this method of writing is that it seems unscientific since it draws upon images which cannot be verified by empirical evidence. But the fact is, not all truth, particularly subjective truth can be palpitated by empirical methodology. In place of the untrustworthiness of the author's role in creating images, "science" seeks to minimize the effect of the author's experience in the collection, understanding, and interpretation of the data by the application of deductive logic which is supposed to describe reality in a way that reduces subjective interpretation. But deductive logic is less free of value or objectivity than commonly assumed (Kaplan 1964)[15].

In writing the CE the author owns up to the fact that in creating the document certain information is embellished, that some points are taken out of the context in which they occurred, and that the overall telling of the story, like the telling of any story, changes over time. The unfortunate assumption has been that any of the three ethnographies I have discussed, the disembodied, the self-indulgent, and the disjointed are free of misleading details and totally objective. Clearly, they are not.

Clinical ethnography is a long process with the final goal of understanding the culture, and of conveying that understanding to readers. The process doesn't start at the outset of the fieldwork or end after the fieldwork is completed.

Learning to write clinical ethnography is more like learning a musical instrument than solving a puzzle. It is never finished, but with each edit it more closely approximate the tune it would like to convey.

Conclusion

At the heart of the ethnographic dilemma are two psychological issues: betrayal and selective memory each of which contributes to pushing the ethnographer into the role of the trickster. Ethnographers, in not being completely honest with their informants, betray confidences. They work feverishly to get information from informants which is then used to serve the ends of the ethnographer. To get this information, friendships are based on false identities. Like tricksters, ethnographers' friendships with their subjects are full of white lies, of partial truths. Even if they tell subjects they are befriending them in order to write about them, ethnographers are telling only part of the truth. They know in ways that the subjects cannot know the distinction between the reality of the fiend and the reality of the university department. Although most ethnographers work hard to avoid causing pain to informants, in the final analysis the ethnographers do what is necessary to get the information that is the essence of their work. Betrayal is part of the ethnographer's dilemma.

There is another aspect of betrayal in ethnography. Ethnographers are tricksters with their readers when they do not fully disclose how they effected the

final outcome of the written document. All written ethnographies involve abstractions of actual experience. The process of abstracting involves deciding on which parts of the experience are worthy of putting into words, how the words are to be placed together to form statements or to make hypotheses, and how much emphasis is chosen for each part of the document - in short the whole document, its form and content, is a matter of choice. To include the work within the scientific method, the writer has to make sufficiently clear to the reader how the data was collected, including how the researcher's inner world view influenced the collection and abstraction of the data and how the conclusions were reached. What makes clinical ethnography valuable as well as valid is that the road is clearly defined to the reader. The goal of clinical ethnography is not the elimination of the effects of personality, but a clear and concise description of it.

Thus, the second psychological issue of the ethnographic dilemma is that of the variety of memory distortions which influence the ethnography. These occur in two forms; first there is the forgetting of unpleasantries associated with the betrayal of the subjects. Secondly, there is the distortion which comes from the ethnographers' past histories when they engage in field work. These distortions contribute to how the topic is chosen, to the avoiding of certain material and people, to the way categories are made from the data, and to what is considered important.

If we ask ourselves why we conduct ethnographic research the answer would give us the direction toward solving the ethnographic dilemma. By doing ethnographies we can increase our understanding of the existence of human universals, the cultural malleability of institutions and the nature of change in the human condition. We can learn how different cultures construct the social world and provide for different ways to participate as citizens in it. We should hope to increase our capacity to critique and suggest reforms in the way people live, not only at broad level of societal reforms, but also by understanding the psychology of people participating in citizenship. These goals of ethnography are in the service of improving the human condition and suggest that we work on important social issues-the very issues which are complex and invoke strong emotional reactions in all of us. To work effectively with important topics it will be necessary to deal with our feelings about the issues the topics raise.

The act of juxtaposing customs of different cultures which are alien to the familiar customs in the culture of the ethnographer, allows for the possibility of disorienting the reader. This forces the reader to examine more closely his or her own cultural traditions. The ethnographer also faces such a disorientation. In the intense process of studying and writing about other cultures, the ethnographer is put on edge about his own-that which is familiar and accepted without reflection, becomes less familiar and open to contemplation. His or her honest portrayal of this experience is a critical part of the search for truth.

In the well written clinical ethnography such disorientation becomes the road to the truth for both the ethnographer and the reader alike. Only in the indulgence of this uncertainty, in its clear if painful description, can the ethnographic dilemma reach resolution.

1. This approach is exemplified in the British School of Social Anthropology by such authors as Radcliffe-Brown, Max Gluckman, and Evans-Pritchard, whose work, about the Nuer (1956) is an often quoted example. In addition to my coinage of the term disembodied ethnography to describe these texts other terms have been used. Van Maanen (1988), for example uses the term "realistic tales" for the same classification. Whatever the moniker ethnographies of this type establish their authority by creating a sense of neutrality gained from the author's academic credentials, and the institutional support these credentials suggest. The texts in this approach work toward a definite single conclusion, which is supported by culling anecdotes and materials to make the conclusion inevitable. This method of work, which assumes absolute authority over the material leaves the reader little chance to argue over the conclusions or methods. It is what Van Maanen [1988] calls "interpretive omnipotence."

2. It was Malinowski's diaries (1967) that drew attention to the fact that ethnographers are people with their own psychologies, and that these personal factors were not only important, but made for interesting reading. In this approach to ethnographies there are several possible author personas. Usually the author is casted, or more appropriately casts him or herself, in the role of an honest apprentice who has been immersed in the culture in order to learn about it. The author presents himself as moving back and forth between his own problems with being in the culture, and his "neutral" observations of it. It is only when, as is the case of Casteneda (1968; 1971), the text becomes focused on the author more than on the culture, that I have

included it in the this self-indulgent category. In fact Casteneda's work has been called a parable masquerading as an ethnography (Geertz 1983) because the work centers around the author's ethical choice of indulging or refraining. There are limits to ethnographies in this category. At some point they ask readers to accept that fieldwork is a better, and indeed a more important, way to learn about the author than it is to learn about the culture he or she went there to study. What the category does show is that the ethnographic dilemma can be so powerful for some ethnographers as to make them focus, almost exclusively, on how they have dealt with the dilemma.

3. Typical of the disjointed approach is the idea that the author's interpretation is sparse or non-existent when the informant presents their story. (See the first half of Dwyer, [1982] where the words of the Faquir are recorded almost verbatim.) Sometimes, the text is written by two people, the ethnographer and the informant. In the case of the Dwyer example the text was almost divided between the Faquir and Dwyer, although Dwyer was the single author. When the material comes from the informants voice it is often presented without a clear structure. The reader is then left without knowledge about the order of events and what conclusions will be reached. Being true to the informant's point of view precludes such knowledge, and it helps the writer avoid the ethnographic dilemma. Since the informant is talking directly to the reading audience the author is not caught between audience and informant, and thus the author no longer has to feel the sense of betrayal that comes from being between the two worlds. However, as if to show that indeed even this does not solve the ethnographic dilemma, disjointed texts often have a pre- or postscript in the form of a

confession which serves a similar role as the introduction does in the disembodied ethnography. Indeed this is the form of the Dwyer (1982) example in the text.

4. I use this work as an example of a type of ethnographic text, and not as a general review of the work. I do the same for the other works cited.

5. The traditional ethnography rests on the methods of abstract hypothesis testing. Upon examining journal articles using this methodology, (I recently received the four issues of the 1989 Journal of Cross-cultural Research), I came upon an interesting phenomena: the titles of the articles were grossly out of proportion to the data. For example, one article entitled, "Moral orientation and moral judgment in adolescents in Hong Kong, Mainland China, and England (Keung Ma 1989)" is drawn from approximately 400 students in all. They were given only a paper and pencil test of "moral dilemmas". From these data readers are expected to accept, as scientific fact, that adolescent morality in these three countries has been adequately explained.

6. In the traditional ethnography the language in the text and in the introduction takes two forms and each engages the reader differently. In the main part of the text the stiff scientific language puts the reader at a distance, while the personal form of the introduction is familiar. Since the introduction comes first it softens the reader, inviting him into the den, readying him to accept what follows.

7. This style has been called "didactic deadpan" by Clarke (1975). The author uses deductive logic, greased by ample quotes from field subjects, to provide an aura of definitive truth. Any sense of self-doubt is not permitted to enter the document.

8. It is interesting that ethnographers receive very little training, or encouragement

to seek their own voice. Instead, the voice is given as ethnographers become academics. This voice is not personal, but efficient. Its value is at making field notes fit into a document which appears accurate, but, as this paper purports, is highly influenced by the ethnographer as trickster. See Ruby (1982) for a collection of essays related to this topic, particularly the essay by Rose (1982: 219-273).

9. My point of view about the children was ascertained through ethnographic field notes, psychological testing, and by examining information that appeared in the media. Knowing that none of the methods I employed could pass all of the methodological criticisms levied on them (there were problems of sampling, of the lack of local norms, of questionable reliability, and of unknown validity), particularly if the criticisms were applied from the tradition of abstract hypothesis testing, I nevertheless used them. I used them as a trickster would, to put up a front that would divert attention away from the natural scientific arguments. This allowed me to use the methods I found to be more meaningful; my own field notes gleaned from my personal encounters, and from the intelligent perceptions I was able to draw from them. The presentation of the "factual" test results was similar to an ethnographic introduction; both serve as smoke screens for the real texts which follow, but which the author feels cannot quite stand on their own without some support.

10. The scientific community reads to find out about the culture which the author has gleaned from "being there", and it is not without merit to expect that the author's personal reflections on their own lives are held in abeyance if the text does not meet these ends. This is the problem faced when the ethnographer writer considers writing

for two audiences, themselves and their professional colleagues. But, another burden of readership faces the ethnographer. Authors of ethnographies have the somewhat unique choice among social science writers of being poised between a general readership which holds out the promise of an author being widely read, or the more curtailed professional audience which reduces the author's potential popularity, but increases the possibility of being accepted among a small, and highly valued group. The same language which might seem highly provocative to the general audience is often considered imprecise to the professional audience. Some writers, caught by the desire to be accepted by both have tried to write for both at the same time, but rarely are they successful (Casteneda).

11. Self reflection alone is not enough. At some point ethnographic information must be put within a framework, or a system of classification. The necessity of giving a structure to the ethnography is what distinguishes ethnography from journalism, or popular travel writing. Such structure includes accurate description of phenomena, building categories by defining which phenomena are included and excluded, identification of themes which connect categories, and giving explanations for why themes exist and how they contribute to the overall culture under study. It is also what allows future researchers the ability to use the information to test hypotheses or to make predictions. This makes CE somewhat like substantive theorizing (Wicker 1989), but CE differs since it includes introspection. Both substantive theorizing and CE call for the use of multiple methods, establishing intimate contact with the domain of study and examining the topic in the context of its social world. However less attention is

given in substantive theorizing to the self analysis of the researcher, which the clinical ethnographer takes as an important basis of understanding.

12. While doing clinical work I became struck with the paradoxical notion of "free association." The opening of a therapy session without direction by the therapist prompts a response by the client, which in turn elicits others, all of which are anything but "free". Instead, they are collections of defenses in the form of diversions, as well as being expressions of "true emotions." Both layers of responses are of equal relevance to understanding the client and both are valid since each represents reality. It is up the therapist to help the client peel back each layer of protection in order to reveal what is not known, but what is fundamentally motivating. Not unlike the therapist, the clinical ethnographer receives information from subjects whose statements reflect many motivations. Often subjects are guided by how they believe the ethnographer might help them, or to avoid ways in which their statements might bring them harm.

In the memory of our childhood encounters with significant people it was not so much the reality of the interchanges that was remembered, it was the impressions that we were left with, that embedded themselves into our private emotional spaces, driving us to see our current world through a heavy lens molded from the imaginary clouds that the so called "real" encounters left us with.

13. In my high school study (Aptekar 1981; 1982) I sat each day in an American civics class where the teacher, an older man, continually used class time to discuss his personal philosophy of life, paying particular attention to the malaise of modern

adolescence. After months of such talk I interceded to question his choice of material. His response was to say "if you don't like the way I'm teaching why don't you take over." To everyone's surprise I did. Marching to the head of the class I began to subvert his message, but to my surprise (and anger) the students took his side, leaving me dangling with plenty of ethnographic material, but to understand any of it I had to spend considerable time and thought filtering the material through my own psychic needs.

14. In literary essays language is used to encourage the reader to experience the emotional impact of the subject matter. In place of the language of behaviorism which describes experience outside of the context of the interaction that brought it about, or in place of the language of "objective" science which moves the reader from samples to generalizations, the language of creative writing is evocative. Acceptance of this type writing is difficult in part because of methodcentrism- a situation in which method, discipline, and academic department have coalesced making suspect researchers who employ methods outside of their academic department. This is disparaging in large part because there are many common elements which make up literary essay writing and ethnography. We share with the literary essayist writer a wide range of options in choosing how an experience will be reported. By using knowledge of detail we both demonstrate that indeed we know about the subject and that we have permeated the reality of the experience. Our works are qualitative and idiosyncratic, coming from choice and individual propensity. What we need is to learn to report how we have made such choices.

15. When Kaplan (1964) described the difference between logic-in-use and reconstructed logic he showed that the logic-in-use by subjects had its own reality and validity, even if illogical or subjective with respect to deductive logic. What reconstructed logic scientists employ, may or may not fit the logic-in-use of the subjects.

Recently, I was at a race horse breeding farm in California looking for a horse to buy from George, the trainer, an Oklahoma man in his fifties. As we were talking, a young Mexican American man, Rudolfo, who worked in the barns and was friends with George's daughter, drove up on his motorcycle. He and George began to talk. After a few minutes of conversation George began to complain about a Mexican workers who had called from a border town wanting airfare to return to work. Addressing Rudolfo with his back to me, George said, "Damn Mexicans can't work worth a damn. It takes two Mexicans to shit." Rudolfo smiled, continuing with the theme "Just as likely as two Blacks having a white baby." Later, we went back to talking about horses. George said, "I didn't care what their blood is if a horse does what I want I like him, if he doesn't he's a worthless son-of-a-bitch. Just like people." Without understanding the logic-in-use of George and Rudolfo it would have been extremely dangerous to use the reconstructed logic of social science to explain the relations between the different ethnic groups in this conversation.

In fact the only way to know, or to learn what logic-in-use is employed by the actors is to hypothesize it from the observer's point of view. This method of reconstruction has the same problem faced by the clinician who tries to understand the

dream of his patient. The patient's dream is the logic-in-use, the therapist's interpretation of the dream is the reconstructed logic of it, and the method used to reconstruct the patient's reality is widely influenced by a variety of factors such as the therapist's education, his personality, the counter transference situation, etc. Deductive logic, which mistakenly is considered synonymous with science, often misses the subjective reality of what is being described- the psychic value of the dream to the client, or the intricacies of the ethnic relations on a horse farm in California. Clinical ethnography acknowledges the precarious nature of facts, and attempt to convey the subtle subjective reality to the reader knowing that at best it will be provocative, and rarely conclusive.

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